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NUISANCE LAW AND THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS 
IN PATENT LAW 
Min-Chiuan Wang† 
Professor Henry E. Smith claims that the doctrine of 
equivalents in patent law is similar to nuisance in the area of property 
law but does not provide many details. Following Smith’s theoretical 
perspectives and the distinction between the exclusion and the 
governance strategies in particular, this Article explains why the 
doctrine of equivalents is similar to nuisance under Smith's theoretical 
framework. The similarity between these sets of doctrines is then 
explored through the Coase theorem and Pareto optimality, which can 
account for both doctrines in a similar fashion. However, using 
different concepts of welfare improvement is in order. Regarding the 
legal defenses of the doctrine of equivalents, such as the prior art bar 
or prosecution history estoppel, these use a preexisting Pareto 
optimality as the basis of the defense. 
  
																																								 																				
† Associate Professor of Law, National Chiao Tung University, Taiwan; Professor Wang holds a 
J.S.D. from Stanford Law School (2001), an LL.M. from Harvard Law School (1996), and an 
LL.B. from National Taiwan University (1989). 
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Professor Henry E. Smith, a prominent property law theorist, 
contends that the doctrine of equivalents in patent law is akin to the 
doctrine of nuisance in property law, on the basis of the following: 
Consistent with the exclusion strategy is today’s “peripheral” 
approach to patent claims, the definition of claims focuses on 
the outer bounds of what is claimed as an invention, without 
the need to specify the interior. The earlier central claim 
method, in which the central case of the invention was 
specified and the boundaries were worked out ex post is more 
of governance regime (in our terms), as is its pale reflection 
in the doctrine of equivalents, under which the scope of a 
claim can be extended beyond the literal reading.1 
However, Smith’s explanation is short, opaque, and difficult for 
readers unfamiliar with property law theory to understand. They might 
																																								 																				
 1. Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in 
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1807 (2007).  
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doubt how the doctrine of equivalents, a patent law rule regarding the 
right to use intangible information, could be considered similar to 
nuisance law, which concerns the uses of land. It is also worth asking 
whether the two doctrines are similar only under Smith’s theoretical 
framework, or whether other theoretical viewpoints support their 
similarity. Moreover, is this similarity valuable? Can it elucidate a 
general understanding of the structure of property rights? 
Nuisance law concerns conflicting land uses by neighboring 
landowners, which has long been a favorite topic of economic analysis. 
Nuisance disputes can be analyzed through direct cost–benefit 
balancing in the Hand-Posner style,2 or Guido Calabresi’s indirect 
“choosing the chooser” method.3 Smith’s analysis of nuisance law 
follows the same utilitarian tradition but takes a theoretical turn by 
proposing two opposing methods of delineating property rights based 
on the information cost theory: the exclusion strategy, which serves as 
the basic regime, and the governance strategy, which serves as the 
supplemental regime.4 
Nuisance law can be characterized as a hybrid regime, exhibiting 
a transition from the exclusion strategy to the governance strategy. The 
mixture and transition between these two strategies in property law 
endows nuisance law with universal application: nuisance law can 
serve as a model to illuminate legal doctrines that have a hybrid nature 
in other areas of law. Based on the observation that patent infringement 
exhibits the same transition from exclusion and governance, this 
Article claims that the doctrine of equivalents is a type of governance 
regime that has been pushed toward formalism. 
The theory underlying this Article is often highlighted in the law 
and economics, or property law literature: the Coase theorem,5 Pareto 
efficiency,6 and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.7 These are invoked to support 
the thesis that the doctrine of equivalents and nuisance law are similar, 
and that the affinity in principle of these two sets of legal rules can be 
appreciated from another theoretical context. 
																																								 																				
 2. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).  
 3. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 
965, 969 (2004). 
 4. Smith, supra note 1, at 1745-46. 
 5. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 6. VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1-19 (Aldo Montesano et al. 
eds., John Cairncross et al. trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2014) (1906). 
 7. John Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); Nicholas 
Kaldor, Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. 
J. 549 (1939). 
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Part I of this Article follows the context of Smith’s theory, 
questioning how nuisance law can be considered similar to the doctrine 
of equivalents and finding that both have a hybrid or transitional nature. 
Part II engages with another theoretical perspective. Ronald 
Coase’s seminal article, The Problem of Social Cost,8 has profoundly 
affected property law in general and nuisance law in particular. The 
connection is obvious: Coase’s article uses cases in nuisance law to 
illustrate his economic theory.9 Part II restates the Coase theorem, 
Pareto optimality, and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. 
Part III reiterates the theories often used to analyze nuisance 
law—the Coase theorem, Pareto optimality, and the balancing of costs 
and benefits—as a foundation for showing the similarities between 
nuisance law and the doctrine of equivalents in patent law. Nuisance 
law is a typical example of cross-boundary allocations of property 
rights. Whether courts can make cross-boundary allocations requires 
the weighing of costs and benefits, which is reflected in elements such 
as reasonableness or substantial interference. In addition, nuisance law 
uses preexisting Pareto optimality as the grounds for defending against 
infringement, based on the rationale that the parties expressly or 
implicitly consented to the conditions of the location.10 The location 
rule (i.e., the character of the neighborhood) is an example.11 
Part IV links the method for determining non-literal infringement 
in patent law to means of improving well-being in economics. Guido 
Calabresi identifies two methods of welfare improvement—“moving 
along the Pareto frontier” (the production possibilities frontier) and 
“moving the Pareto frontier outward.”12 A Pareto superior move along 
the frontier can be made by voluntary transactions, such as licensing 
agreements, whereas moving the Pareto frontier outward refers to 
innovations that make previously impossible welfare improvements 
feasible.13 In patent law, an accused infringer who makes a substantial 
change to the technology in question would move the Pareto frontier 
outward. Even if the accused infringer did use some technological ideas 
from the claimed invention, the court would find the accused product 
																																								 																				
 8. Coase, supra note 5. 
 9. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 
54 J.L. & ECON. S77, S84 n.5 (2011) (listing the cases related to nuisance law in Coase’s The 
Problem of Social Cost). 
 10. Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 
8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 87-90 (1979).  
 11. Id. at 87. 
 12. Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 
1211, 1212 (1991). 
 13. Id. at 1212, 1231. 
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or process not substantially similar to the claimed invention, and 
reallocate property rights to the resource (i.e., the inventive concept of 
the claimed invention) with a finding of non-infringement. 
The finding of non-infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents, similar to the test of reasonableness, is a process by which 
courts weigh the benefit of the defendant’s act against its cost.14 The 
difference is that, in patent law, the well-being improvement that 
justifies judicial reallocation of rights is even narrower; only “moving 
the frontier outward” can justify the court’s reallocation of rights under 
the doctrine of equivalents. 
I. SMITH’S THEORY: FROM NUISANCE LAW TO THE 
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS 
In this section, this Article follows Professor Smith’s theoretical 
insight, especially the contrast between the exclusion strategy and the 
governance strategy, to discuss why, under his theoretical framework, 
the doctrine of equivalents in patent law can be seen as resembling the 
doctrine of nuisance in property law, and the value of this likeness. 
A. Smith on Nuisance: Following the Utilitarian Tradition 
Nuisance is the conflict between neighboring land owners 
regarding how they use their respective land. Nuisance occurs when 
the defendant’s acts on his own land interfere with those of the 
plaintiff.15 Typical examples of such interferences include emissions of 
odors, smoke, or vibrations, and such a dispute “pits two landowners 
against one another.”16 “Conflicting” is the defining characteristic of 
nuisance disputes, specifically a conflict between one landowner’s 
interest of use and the other’s exclusion right.17 A treatise on the 
relations of neighboring owners defines the doctrine of nuisance as 
“[t]he basic legal mechanism for resolving disputes between neighbors 
in their capacity as property holders” with “conflicts arising from the 
physical proximity of [the] parties […].”18 Nuisance disputes occur 
																																								 																				
 14. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609-10 (1950). 
 15. JAMES H. BACKMAN & DAVID A. THOMAS, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO DISPUTES 
BETWEEN ADJOINING LANDOWNERS—EASEMENTS § 9.03 (2017). 
 16. Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law: 
1850 to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1104 (1986); Jeff L. Lewin, Compensated Injunctions 
and the Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71 IOWA L. REV. 775, 775, 780 (1986). 
 17. Lewin, supra note 16, at 788. 
 18. JAMES C. SMITH & JACQUELINE P. HAND, NEIGHBORING PROPERTY OWNERS § 2:1 
(2016).  
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between lands subject to various types of use, such as residential, 
agricultural, or industrial use, and combinations thereof.19 
The development of modern nuisance law has been deeply 
influenced by the economic analysis of law and can be considered to 
begin with Coase’s seminal article The Problem of Social Cost.20 Thus, 
Smith’s discussion on nuisance law inevitably starts with the economic 
concerns of the nuisance disputes: how the externalities caused by an 
actor can be internalized.21 “When the question is how to internalize 
pollution externalities or whether people bargain under the shadow of 
property rules and liability rules, economic models present the dispute 
as a conflict between plaintiff and defendant […].”22 This initial 
observation combines Coase’s reciprocity of causality with the two-by-
two matrix of Calabresi and Melamed concerning who shall have the 
entitlements (the perpetrator or the victim) and what remedy shall be 
given (injunction or damages).23 “[W]hen conflicts between actors and 
their activities arise, a court's job, particularly where transaction costs 
are high, is to decide which use shall prevail.”24 
Efficient resource allocation assumes that actors are responsible 
for the costs caused by their own acts, instead of transferring the cost 
to others who are neither consenting nor reimbursed for the loss, which 
would become an external cost.25 Traditionally, economists assume 
that an actor should be responsible for the external costs imposed on 
others and account for such externalities in pricing decisions.26 Coase 
proposes that we should shift the focus to considering which of the two 
conflicting uses the society should opt for.27 In addition, using the least 
																																								 																				
 19. Id.  
 20. See Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, and 
Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 191 (1990) (noting that the development of nuisance law was 
influenced by the law and economics movement in the 1970s). See also Lewin, supra note 16, at 
785 (attributing the origin of modern nuisance law to Coase’s article).  
 21. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternative to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and 
Fines as Land Use Control, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 684-86 (1973) (discussing the thesis that 
nuisance law services as a mechanism of internalizing negative externalities); M. Theresa Hupp, 
Efficient Land Use and the Internalization of Beneficial Spillovers: An Economic and Legal 
Analysis, 31 STAN. L. REV. 457, 464 (1970).  
 22. Smith, supra note 3, at 966.  
 23. Compare Coase, supra note 5, at 2 (reciprocity of causality), and Guido Calabresi & 
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090-92 (1972), with Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, 
What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 391-94 (2001) 
(disagreeing with the thesis of reciprocal causality and criticizing “causal agnosticism”). See also 
Lewin, supra note 16, at 785-86, 789. 
 24. Smith, supra note 3, at 967.  
 25. Id. at 967-69. 
 26. See Coase, supra note 5, at 1-2. See also Smith, supra note 3, at 968-69. 
 27. Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and 
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cost avoider strategy, the law can allocate the liability to the party who 
could avoid the loss with the least cost, rather than require a non-least-
cost avoider to adopt precautionary measures.28 Clear economic 
consideration is evident in the elements of liability and the remedies of 
modern nuisance law. Courts use various balancing tests to find either 
that the defendant’s act is not a nuisance or to limit the plaintiff to the 
remedy of damages.29 Since Coase’s seminal article, the legal rules of 
nuisance have been significantly influenced by the Coasean approach 
to the economic analysis of law.30 
In addition to conflict, another defining feature of nuisance law is 
its emphasis on reasonableness; the resolution of conflict is tied to the 
reasonableness of the behavior.31 The idea of reasonableness in 
nuisance law originated in the incorporation of tort principles during 
the nineteenth century.32 Adopting the balance of utilities test or the 
totality of circumstances test to define reasonable use, the courts 
impose liability on a defendant’s activity characterized as 
unreasonable.33 The doctrine of reasonableness has become a means 
for courts to harmonize and adjust parties’ rights and privileges, and 
																																								 																				
Natural Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379, 1385-86 (2010) (observing that Coase 
refuted the Pigouvian view of how to internalize externalities).  
 28. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (1970) (proposing the cheapest cost avoider concept for the first time). See also Guido 
Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060-
61 (1972) (advocating that the cheapest cost avoider strategy should serve as the test for strict 
liability). This term “cheapest cost avoider” denotes someone who can avoid the accident with 
the least cost. It is suggested that a legal rule that imposes the liability on the cheapest cost avoider 
is efficient and can promote the efficient allocation of resources. See Stephen G. Gilles, 
Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 VA. L. REV. 1291, 1306 (1992). 
See also Lewin, supra note 16, at 787-88.  
 29. Lewin, supra note 16, at 775.  
 30. Id. at 775, 785 (noting that the approach to modern nuisance law originated from 
Coase’s 1960 article). Some commentators, however, prefer to base the explanation of nuisance 
law on natural rights morality rather than on Coasean economic analysis. Claeys, supra note 27, 
at 1409-11; Bone, supra note 16, at 1105-06 (proposing three natural-rights-based nuisance 
models). 
 31. Hupp, supra note 21, at 463-64; Jeff L. Lewin, Comparative Nuisance, 50 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 1009, 1018 (1989); George P. Smith, II, & Matthew Saunig, Reconceptualizing the Law of 
Nuisance Through a Theory of Economic Captivity, 75 ALB. L. REV. 57, 60-62 (2012); Paul J. 
Heald & James Charles Smith, The Problem of Social Cost in a Genetically Modified Age, 58 
HASTINGS L.J. 87, 116 (2006). See Claeys, supra note 27, at 1419 (“Nuisance is often defined as 
a direct interference with a landowner’s use rights that causes harm and is unreasonable.”).  
 32. Lewin, supra note 16, at 779 (“In the nineteenth century America witnessed a profound 
evolution of nuisance doctrine from its roots in property law into a doctrine of tort law, imbued 
with the concepts of ‘fault’ and ‘reasonableness.’”).  
 33. Id. at 780 (Except for a minority of “nuisance per se” cases, reasonableness is 
considered under the totality of circumstances, including “the nature and location of the offending 
activity, the character of the neighborhood, the frequency and extent of the intrusion, and the 
effect on life, health, and the enjoyment of property.”). 
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even to reach “intermediate solutions” to their legitimate but 
incompatible activities.34 
From the perspective of law and economics, the reasonableness of 
the behavior would most likely be analyzed in terms of balancing costs 
and benefits. As one commentator put it, “‘Reasonable’ activity could 
be defined merely as cost-effective activity;”35 “weighing the utility of 
the landowner’s use of the land and the gravity of the harm to the 
neighbors was a proper method of determining reasonableness.”36 
Economic analysis is at the “fulcrum” of the balancing test and should 
be used in resolving nuisance disputes to promote the common good of 
society—a reasonable behavior is one that could maximize the 
aggregate wealth.37 However, this does not necessarily mean that 
courts have often conducted explicit cost-benefit balancing or have 
always made welfare-maximizing decisions. As Smith notes, judges 
“often have paid no more than lip service to balancing and have instead 
hewed to a more traditional mode of analysis.”38 
According to Smith’s observation, nuisance law and torts are 
similar from the perspective of economic analysis.39 Two types of 
economic analysis are relevant here. The first approach, which has 
become the mainstream view in nuisance law, is the direct balancing 
of costs and benefits, as exemplified by Posner and Judge Learned 
Hand.40 The tenet of this approach is to seek the optimal resource 
allocation or precautionary measures to maximize the welfare of 
society.41 This criterion of weighing and balancing, as applied to 
nuisance disputes, is supported by the Restatement of Torts and 
scholarly commentaries.42 The second approach, primarily proposed by 
																																								 																				
 34. Lewin, supra note 20, at 202-05; Lewin, supra note 31, at 1011-12 (describing nuisance 
law as “a series of adjustments and compromises to limit the rights and privileges of both parties” 
and pointing to the possibility of intermediate solutions to incompatible economic activities).  
  35. Hupp, supra note 21, at 463.  
  36. Id. at 463 n.22. See Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396 (1966). 
 37. Smith & Saunig, supra note 31, at 62-63.  
 38. Smith, supra note 3, at 967.  
 39. Id.  
 40.  Id. at 967-69. Judge Learned Hand developed the Carroll Towing formula in 1947. See 
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173. However, the test came to prominence at the hand of Judge 
Richard Posner. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 63 (7th ed. 
2007). See also Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Juridical Decision-Making, 4 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 131, 132-33 (1984) (discussing how cost-benefit analysis can be utilized as a 
tool of social choice and a guide in the governmental and judicial decision-making processes, for 
the purpose of maximizing the society’s well-being).  
  41. Smith, supra note 3, at 969.  
  42. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 826-828 (AM. LAW INST.1934); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827-828 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). See also Lewin, supra note 20, at 264 
(observing that Posner’s view in the area of nuisance law comes primarily from Coase, Calabresi, 
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Calabresi, is an indirect approach of “choosing the chooser”—finding 
the cheapest cost avoider or the best decision maker, who can best use 
the information at hand to calculate the efficiency of available 
alternatives to reach an optimal point of deterrence, where the sum of 
the cost of the accident and the cost of precaution is the smallest.43 
Instead of directly looking for the optimal allocation of resources, 
courts would place the liability on the least cost avoider among the 
group of possible avoiders.44 Thus, if a polluter is considered the 
cheapest cost avoider, its neighboring pollutee obtains the entitlement 
to be free from pollution.45 
B. Exclusion Strategy and Governance Strategy 
Although he followed the path of utilitarian analysis, Smith took 
a theoretical turn to focusing on the information costs of delineating 
property rights. His unique contribution lies in formulating a model that 
contains the “exclusion strategy,” the “governance strategy,”46 and 
hybrids (as in a “spectrum”) of the two strategies47 to explain the 
composition of the doctrines in nuisance law. He observes that the 
doctrines in nuisance law are one of the hybrid regimes that combine 
the exclusive and governance strategies.48 The economic analysis of 
																																								 																				
Melamed, and Ellickson). 
 43. Smith, supra note 3, at 968; Lewin, supra note 20, at 243.  
 44. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 28, at 1060. See also Calabresi & Melamed, 
supra note 23, at 1096-97; Yuval Sinai & Benjamin Shmueli, Calabresi and Maimonides’s Tort 
Law Theories—A Comparative Analysis and a Preliminary Sketch of a Modern Model of 
Differential Pluralistic Tort Liability Based on the Two Theories, 26 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 59, 
66-67 (2014).  
 45. Smith, supra note 3, at 969. See also Barbara Ann White, Risk-Utility Analysis and the 
Learned Hand Formula: A Hand That Helps or A Hand That Hides?, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 77, 79 
(1990).  
 46. See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1728 
(2004) (describing the exclusion strategy as one “in which very rough signals—like presence 
inside or outside a boundary line around a parcel of land—are used to protect an indefinite class 
of uses with minimal precision,” and the governance strategy as one in which “the internalization 
problem is solved on something close to a use-by-use basis . . . using signals that pick out and 
protect individual uses and user behavior”). 
 47. Id. (arguing that between the two poles—i.e., the exclusion strategy and the governance 
strategy—are “strategies of a mixed sort that bunch uses together under variables of intermediate 
precision”); Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 
ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 446 (2008) (explaining that his information-cost theory derives a model 
consisting of “two poles and a spectrum of strategies for delineating and enforcing property 
rights” and various hybrid models in-between). Smith maintains that water laws—both 
riparianism and prior appropriation—are other examples of such hybrid systems. Id. at 458.  
 48. Smith traces the distinction of the exclusion strategy and the governance strategy to 
economist Steven Cheung and property law theorist Carol M. Rose. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion 
versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, 
S455-56 (2002).  
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law, seemingly more consistent with the governance strategy, 
considers nuisance law from the perspectives of cost–benefit balancing 
and the reasonableness of use.49 Traditional legal analysis, nonetheless, 
focuses more on the paradigm of in rem rights—which is more 
consistent with the exclusion strategy—and looks for signs of intrusion 
into boundaries. As Smith observes, the Coasean approach of building 
property rights stick by stick “is not at all how the law usually 
proceeds” with nuisance disputes.50 Courts often simply ask whether 
the plaintiff’s rights are violated, and then to inquire into whether the 
plaintiff’s rights are infringed, they often look into whether the 
defendant’s act physically invades the plaintiff’s land.51 
Professor Thomas W. Merrill, in a paper coauthored with Smith, 
disparages the “bundle-of-rights” view of property that has become 
dominant in American property law since the last century.52 Influenced 
by legal realism and the economic analysis of law, the bundle-of-rights 
concept incorporates rights into ownership in a stick-by-stick manner. 
“Coase assumed that property is the result of decisions over use-
conflicts and that property is, in essence, a list of use rights.”53 Yet as 
Merrill and Smith observe, the bundle-of-rights view is not a unique 
creation by Coase but the consensus of the American legal academia in 
the mid-twentieth century.54 In this view, the question of what rights 
should be given to whom is not predetermined, but determined in an ad 
hoc manner and then incorporated into the concept of ownership.55 For 
Merrill and Smith, however, this ad hoc manner of composing property 
rights imposes high transaction costs on participants in the economy.56 
The in rem nature of property imposes on all others the duty of 
noninterference.57 The ad hoc, stick-by-stick method of composing 
																																								 																				
 49. Smith, supra note 3, at 973. 
 50. Id. at 969-70. 
 51. Id. (noting that courts and the commentators, based on corrective justice, often place 
emphasis on the physical invasion aspect of nuisance cases). 
 52. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at S90-92. 
 53. Smith, supra note 3, at 1001.  
 54. Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at S80-81 (noting that the “bundle-of-rights” view of 
property was a “thoroughly modern notion” at the time when Coase created his seminal works, 
and that property was considered as a “minisovereignty” of the owner over a thing during the 
nineteenth century or earlier). 
 55. Smith, supra note 3, at 969; Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at S82 (describing the legal 
realist concept of property as “a bundle of rights or sticks,” with the term “property” serving as a 
label attached to a set of rights and duties. The contents of the bundle “vary from thing to thing, 
from place to place, and even from person to person.”).  
 56. Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at S78.  
 57. Id. at S81. 
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rights heavily burdens the addressees of the rights discourse (i.e., the 
potential infringers of rights).58 
Both exclusion and governance are means of internalizing 
externalities.59 Smith argues that it makes sense, according to 
information cost theory, to treat exclusion as the basic regime and 
governance as the supplemental regime.60 The exclusion strategy, 
which defines the property right as an in rem right that entitles the 
owner to exclude the interference of all others, focuses on the 
enforcement of boundaries.61 This is to entrust the information problem 
to the owner, who serves as the “gatekeeper” of the resource.62 
Boundaries are the special feature of the exclusion regime, since the 
exclusion strategy uses coarse proxies, particularly boundaries.63 
The exclusion rule serves as the “baseline” for evaluating 
nuisance cases. For example, in cases of substantial harm caused by the 
defendant’s behavior, the court does not need to measure the attributes 
of an individual use but applies the exclusion rule directly. The rule of 
nuisance per se shows the use of exclusion rules in nuisance disputes.64 
Nuisance cases are also related to the location of the use conflict in 
question, for several reasons. First, traditionally, to evaluate whether 
nuisance occurs, the disturbance must originate from the defendant’s 
land and cause harm on the use of the plaintiff’s land. In other words, 
whether the defendant’s behavior enters into the space of the plaintiff’s 
land is defined by the ad coelum rule.65 Second, whether a use 
constitutes nuisance is highly relevant to the characteristics of the 
neighborhood; the community standards become the threshold of 
nuisance liability.66 Smith considers both the boundaries and the 
																																								 																				
 58. Id. at S89-90.  
 59. Smith, supra note 3, at 980-81.  
 60. Id. at 975-76, 988-92, 1006-07, 1032, 1046-49. 
 61. Id. at 972-73, 978-79. 
 62. Id. at 972-73. The exclusion strategy sees the owner as the “gatekeeper” of the 
resources. See Smith, supra note 48, at S454-55, n.3 (quoting the view of James E. Penner).  
 63. Smith, supra note 48, at S454-55 (the right of exclusion uses rough proxies such as 
boundaries and the ad coelum rule). 
 64. Smith, supra note 3, at 997-98 (explaining that when the disturbance caused by the 
defendant’s use is significant or obvious, the defendant constructively deprives the plaintiff of his 
or her possession and, consequently, the court can apply the exclusion rule directly and need not 
evaluate the context of use). Nuisance per se is an act that causes material harm so that the 
contextual information regarding the location of the act and the parties is very unlikely to change 
the result of the decision; in such a situation, there is little benefit for the court to incur more costs 
by inquiring into contextual factors of the use. See id. 
 65. See id. at 998 (noting that “nuisance is about invasions of a more ethereal sort”). See 
also id. at 999 (“Traditionally . . . location and physical invasion are very important informational 
variables in the law of nuisance.”).  
 66. See, e.g., id. at 1002-04 (describing the locality rule).  
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location as the essential and typical variables of the exclusion 
strategy.67 Finally, the remedies for nuisance cases include injunctions, 
applying the property rule and exclusion to protect the “delegation” to 
the property owner to decide how to use the resource.68 
At the other pole of the spectrum of the “organizational 
dimension” of property rights,69 the governance strategy often 
functions as a supplemental strategy.70 The governance strategy 
measures some essential uses of the resource, and considers the 
appropriateness of each use. This is a more precise and delicate method 
but incurs higher measurement costs.71 The governance strategy 
corresponds to a view of property rights closer to that of legal realism 
or Coase.72 The use of the governance strategy is often justified when 
the resource at issue has a higher value or when the transaction cost is 
high because of the higher information cost involved.73 
The major distinction between the exclusion strategy and the 
governance strategy lies in that, in the former, the court focuses on the 
enforcement of boundaries, with entry into boundaries serving as a 
coarse information variable to define the rights and to indirectly protect 
various uses within the boundaries.74 In the governance strategy, the 
court focuses on defining the reasonable scope of the right. The court 
looks into whether the use is reasonable or proper, and even conducts 
cost–benefit balancing;75 a governance regime is “a set of rules of 
proper use.”76 In defining the reasonable scope of rights, the court has 
more room to coordinate the conflicting interests of the right owner and 
the user. Therefore, the governance strategy is more likely to emerge 
in areas that require balancing of the interests of the right owner and 
the user.77 When multiple uses become more necessary, coarse 
variables (such as entry into the boundaries) are inadequate to handle 
																																								 																				
 67. Id. at 1004-05. 
 68. Id. at 1005.  
 69. Smith, supra note 48, at S454-55, S467 (arguing that this spectrum “reflects the costs 
and benefits of proxy measurement”); accord Claeys, supra note 27, at 1405 (a spectrum between 
limited rights of use and unlimited rights of possession).  
 70. Smith conceives the exclusion strategy as the major mode of property composition, 
while the governance strategy serves as a supplemental strategy to further refine property rights. 
See Smith, supra note 48, at S456. 
 71. Id. at S467.  
 72. Smith, supra note 3, at 976.  
 73. Id. at 996-97 (noting that the governance strategy is used when “high[er] stakes” are 
present or when the costs of contracting are high).  
 74. Id. at 972-73. 
 75. Id. at 973-74. 
 76. Id. at 975-76. 
 77. Fair use in copyright law is a typical example of the governance regime. Smith, supra 
note 1, at 1812-14. 
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the conflicting multiple uses; thus, the court requires more precise 
variables to measure the uses directly.78 
At the remedy stage of nuisance cases, a shift from the exclusion 
strategy to the governance strategy is often evident. The exclusion 
strategy is often combined with property rules and injunctions, whereas 
the governance strategy is more likely when the value of coexisting 
uses becomes higher. The governance strategy allows the parties to 
adjust their relation by contracting, and it also allows the court to 
measure the attributes of each individual use and to tailor the remedy 
accordingly. “As multiple uses become more important, a governance 
regime of some sort should tend to emerge [...].”79 
Smith proposes that nuisance law is a mixture of the exclusion 
strategy and the governance strategy, or a transitional scheme shifting 
from exclusion to governance.80 He suggests that “nuisance is not so 
much a mess or a mystery as a hybrid between different methods of 
delineating rights, which reflects the information costs incurred in 
employing these strategies.”81 Smith’s further contribution is to explain 
the choice between the exclusion strategy and the governance strategy 
with the information cost theory.82 He contends that the exclusion 
strategy is the lower-cost strategy between the two.83 The same result 
is evident in Richard Epstein’s contention of “the dominance of 
property rules.”84 Quoting Hume, Epstein states that the stability of 
possession is “one of the dominant rules of society.”85 In nuisance 
cases, as Epstein observed, injunction is the basic rule in the situation 
of substantial nuisance.86 The law normally attempts to deter invasion, 
and property rights can be changed only through voluntary 
transaction.87 
C. Nuisance Law and Patent Infringement as Two Hybrid 
Regimes 
The foundation of nuisance law is primarily the exclusion regime, 
which is supplemented with the governance regime. According to 
																																								 																				
 78. Smith, supra note 3, at 981-82.  
 79. Id. at 1005-06. 
 80. Id. at 996-97, 1002.  
 81. Id. at 970.  
 82. Id. at 974, 981-82, 996-97. 
 83. Id. at 980-85. 
 84. Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of the Property 
Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2096-2105 (1997).  
 85. Id. at 2097.   
 86. Id. at 2101. 
 87. Id.  
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Smith, this is a relatively low-cost method of delineating rights.88 
“Nuisance employs this exclusion regime when it comes to gross 
invasions of clear boundaries, but supplements the exclusion regime 
with fine-tuned governance rules.”89 
The universal applicability of nuisance law lies in the coexistence 
of the exclusion strategy, the inherent governance strategy, and its clear 
transition from exclusion to governance.90 “Nuisance rests on a 
foundation of exclusion, […] but it also fine-tunes this hard-edged 
regime where the stakes are high enough and courts have some 
advantage in providing off-the-rack governance rules.”91 Shifting from 
the exclusion model to the governance model—that is, shifting from 
boundaries as the information variable to the attributes of use—this 
type of transition can also be observed in easement by necessity or 
water law. When this sort of shifting occurs is an empirical question.92 
Portraying nuisance as where “property law encounters tort law” 
clearly indicates the transition from the exclusion strategy to the 
governance strategy.93 Whereas the traditional approach of nuisance 
law was based on the physical invasion test94 and focused on intrusion 
across boundaries, the modern approach of nuisance law focuses on 
evaluating the attributes of uses.95 The transitional nature of nuisance 
law, as demonstrated by Carol M. Rose in her essay on the historical 
evolution of water rights, entails a change from monopoly (absolute 
rights) to vaguely-defined, commonly-owned group rights.96 In light of 
Smith’s theory, the early stage can be construed as an exclusion regime 
focused on the boundaries, and the later stage as a governance regime 
focused on the direct evaluation of the attributes of uses. Using a fine-
tuned governance model, judicial governance can create greater 
benefits of multiple uses of the same resource. The intersecting area 
near the boundaries is often where the court can exercise governance. 
																																								 																				
 88. Smith, supra note 3, at 976.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 976, 1045.  
 91. Id. at 1024. 
 92. Id. at 1024-25. 
 93. Epstein, supra note 10, at 49 (“Nuisance is a very old branch of tort law.”); accord 
William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REV. 399, 410-16 (1942).  
 94. See Claeys, supra note 27, at 1409 (“[A] nuisance suit ordinarily requires some 
physical invasion.”). See also Epstein, supra note 10, at 53 (“Nuisances are invasions of the 
plaintiff’s property that fall short of trespasses”); id. at 57 (“[O]nly physical invasion of protected 
interests gives rise to a prima facie case of liability.”).  
 95. Smith, supra note 3, at 974. 
 96. CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, 
AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 166, 179-80 (1994) (Water law played an important role in the 
later nineteenth-century nuisance law, which shows an evolution process from absolute rights to 
commonly-owned correlative rights).  
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To elucidate Smith’s claim that the doctrine of equivalents is 
similar to nuisance law, this pronouncement must be placed in the 
context of his theory that distinguishes the exclusion strategy and the 
governance strategy. Two forms of patent infringement exist, literal 
infringement and infringement by equivalency. Infringement by 
equivalency is considered the “second prong” of patent infringement.97 
For literal infringement, the exclusion strategy is applied, as it is for the 
cause of action of trespass: a literal infringement has occurred if the 
patent claim reads on the accused device, substance, or procedure.98 
For infringement by equivalency, as with nuisance, the governance 
strategy is applied. The judicial role in the determination of 
equivalency, just as in nuisance cases, is twofold: the court must 
exercise contextual judgment, making an integrated decision based on 
a series of relevant factors, and as a result, the decision of equivalency 
must draw fair boundaries of the patentee’s rights.99 
The determination of equivalency must be context based. As the 
U.S. Supreme Court indicated in Graver Tank Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air 
Products Co., “[w]hat constitutes equivalency must be determined 
against the context of the patent, the prior art, and the particular 
circumstances of the case.”100 One particular distinction that 
exemplifies the contextual nature of equivalency decisions is 
interchangeability being listed by the Graver Tank court as an 
“important factor” that supports the finding of equivalency;101 
however, it is only one factor to be considered among others. 
“Equivalency, in patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula and is not 
an absolute to be considered in a vacuum.”102 This famous 
pronouncement by the Graver Tank court reveals the contextual nature 
																																								 																				
 97. See generally Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1423, 1443 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997); Penwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 952 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(distinguishing literal infringement and infringement by equivalency); Cybor Corp. v. FAS 
Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma 
(USA) Inc., 467 F.3d 1370, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Sean T. Moorhead, The Doctrine of 
Equivalents: Rarely Actionable Non-Literal Infringement or the Second Prong of Patent 
Infringement Charges?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1421, 1424 (1992).  
 98. Clyde F. Willian & Joseph S. Miller, Muddy Waters: Infringement Analysis after 
Markman and Warner-Jenkinson, 7 FED. CIR. B.J. 227, 227 (1997) (assimilating patent 
infringement to trespassing on the territory over which the patentee can exercise his power of 
exclusion).   
 99. Mark D. Janis, Who's Afraid of Functional Claims? Reforming the Patent Law's § 112, 
¶ 6 Jurisprudence, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 231, 263 (1999) 
(“equivalency as a flexible tool for advancing ‘general fairness’”).  
 100. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950). 
 101. Id. See Ring & Pinion Serv. Inc. v. ARB Corp. Ltd., 743 F.3d 831, 834 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(known interchangeability as a factor to be considered); Abraxis Bioscience, Inc., 467 F.3d at 
1382.   
 102. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609.  
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of decisions concerning equivalency, which must be determined 
“against the context of the patent” and is “not an absolute.”103 All of 
these statements characterize the doctrine of equivalents as a 
governance regime. 
The doctrine of equivalents as a governance regime is most clearly 
revealed in the Federal Circuit’s decision in Hilton Davis Chemical Co. 
v. Warner-Jenkinson Company, Inc.104 Hilton Davis, an en banc 
decision by the Federal Circuit to resolve the issues related to the 
doctrine of equivalents,105 proclaimed to “restate” rather than to 
“revise” the test for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents in 
previous case law.106 Hilton Davis elevated the substantiality of the 
difference to the primary criterion for assessing equivalency.107 By 
tying equivalency to a somewhat vague standard,108 the Hilton Davis 
court paved the way for judicial exercise of governance in the 
determination of equivalency. 
The Hilton Davis decision first quoted Justice Story’s opinion in 
Odiorne v. Winkley109 to establish that equivalency denotes 
nonsubstantial or “[m]ere colorable differences, or slight 
improvements, [which] cannot shake the right of the original 
inventor.”110 To avoid constituting infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents, the accused product or process must embody a substantial, 
not merely colorable, change of the claimed product or process.111 The 
court also cited the Supreme Court’s Graver Tank decision for the same 
principle: “the doctrine [of equivalents] applies if, and only if, the 
differences between the claimed and accused products or processes are 
insubstantial.”112 
																																								 																				
 103. Id. 
 104. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512, 1516-28 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995).  
 105. Id. at 1515 n.1.  
 106. Id. at 1516. See James K. Folker, A Legislative Proposal to Clarify and Simplify Patent 
Infringement Analysis under the Doctrine of Equivalents, 6 FED. CIR. B.J. 211, 212 (1996).   
 107. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1518 (holding that “the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents rests on the substantiality of the differences between the claimed and accused products 
and processes, assessed according to an objective standard”); id. at 1517 (treating insubstantial 
differences as “the necessary predicate” for constituting equivalency). 
 108. Moorhead, supra note 97, at 1428 (noting that “there are no bright lines” in the 
determination of equivalency). 
109. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1530. 
 110. Id. at 1517 (citing Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F.Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814)). 
 111. See, e.g., Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929) (no substantial 
departure from the patent, a mere colorable departure therefrom). 
 112. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519 (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 
339 U.S. 605, 610 (1950)).  
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The Federal Circuit in Hilton Davis also proclaimed that 
equivalency is fundamentally the determination of substantial 
difference, and that the tripartite test of means, function, and result is a 
method to measure the difference.113 However, although these three 
factors contribute to determining equivalency, additional factors 
exist.114 The tripartite test is without a doubt the most prevalent 
approach,115 with function, way, and result serving as proxies for the 
substantiality of differences because “similarity of function, way, and 
result leaves little room for doubt that only insubstantial differences 
distinguish the accused product or process from the claims.”116 Other 
factors related to the determination of equivalency include known 
interchangeability,117 evidence of copying, and evidence of 
circumvention designs.118 The court also emphasized that all evidence 
concerning the substantiality of differences, if presented by the record 
of the case, should be considered by the fact finder.119 
The Hilton Davis approach to the doctrine of equivalents presents 
a typical governance regime, employing a standard-based mode of 
adjudication. As a clear voice of the governance strategy, the Federal 
Circuit proclaimed, citing the majority opinion of the Supreme Court’s 
Graver Tank decision, that “equivalency, in patent law, is not the 
prisoner of a formula.”120 The standard-based approach to determining 
equivalency was previously revealed by the Graver Tank majority 
opinion.121 The governance strategy allows courts, through weighing 
multiple factors in a standard-based adjudication, to simulate the Pareto 
optimality that would be reached under the ideal conditions. The 
approach to determining equivalency in the Federal Circuit’s Hilton 
																																								 																				
 113. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1518. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. 
 117. For known interchangeability as a factor weighing in favor of finding infringement 
under the doctrine of equivalents, see Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609; Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. 
v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 36 (1997); Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. 
U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, 
Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  
 118. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519-20.  
 119. Id. at 1518. 
 120. Id. (citing Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609).  
 121. See John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: The Doctrine of Equivalents in the Post-
Markman Era, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 153, 156 (2005) (contrasting the Supreme Court 
majority’s standards-oriented approach in Graver Tank with the dissenting opinion’s rules-based 
approach to the doctrine of equivalents). See also 4 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS 
§ 13:68 (4th ed. 2017) (characterizing the different approaches to the determination of factual 
equivalency as rules versus standards).  
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Davis decision is similar to how reasonableness is determined in 
nuisance law. 
Nevertheless, the governance strategy may be formalized for 
several reasons and turned into a rules-based mode of adjudication, 
which can be embodied in an exclusion regime in property law.122 One 
of the reasons courts develop formal concepts and rules is to reduce the 
information costs of measuring multiple proxies.123 In addition, an 
increase in the value of the asset brings the need to enhance the 
predictability of judicial decisions, pushing the rule system further 
toward the direction of formalism and the exclusion strategy.124 
However, because a rule covers more limited facts than a standard 
does, it often requires combining several rules—some serving as the 
boundaries of the right (as baselines in property) and some serving as 
defenses to the right (as exceptions in property)125—to achieve what a 
standard-based mode of adjudication can do, which is to approximate 
Pareto optimality under the ideal conditions. 
Through its decision in Warner-Jenkinson Company, Inc. v. 
Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,126 the Supreme Court, sharing the anxiety 
that the dissenters in Graver Tank and Hilton Davis felt toward the 
standard-based mode of adjudication,127 effected a formalistic turn in 
the doctrine of equivalency. The Warner-Jenkinson decision used 
several rules (in the end, a myriad of rules) to replace the standard-
based adjudication model established in Graver Tank and Hilton Davis. 
If the approach pronounced by the Federal Circuit in Hilton Davis was 
able to continue its path, the determination of equivalency today would 
probably resemble how the likelihood of confusion is determined in 
trademark law. However, the Supreme Court’s formalistic turn in 
Warner-Jenkinson wove a complicated web of rules, consisting not 
only of rules (the all-elements rule, the function-way-result test, the 
insubstantial differences test),128 but also exceptions to the rules 
(prosecution history estoppel, claim vitiation),129 as well as exceptions 
to the exceptions (several exceptions to prosecution history 
																																								 																				
 122. Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097, 
2105-06 (2012) (the right of exclusion and “owner-as-the-gatekeeper” are formal concepts). 
Smith defines formalism as relative indifference to context; a rule system more formal in its 
application and interpretation is less dependent on context. Id. at 2105.    
 123. See id. at 2108. 
 124. Smith, supra note 1, at 1815-17.  
 125. For the distinction of baselines and exceptions in property, see Smith, supra note 122, 
at 2120-27. 
 126. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 127. Id. at 28-29. 
 128. Id. at 39-40.  
 129. Id. at 40-41. 
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estoppel).130 The Supreme Court’s decision in Festo Corporation v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd. continued this path of 
constructing a complex rule system, admitting three exceptions to 
prosecution history estoppel.131 
The Supreme Court’s formalistic turn since the Warner-Jenkinson 
decision shows the Court’s anxiety concerning the vague boundaries of 
rights under a governance regime, and represents the Court’s pursuit of 
the value of certainty, which could be the virtue of an exclusion regime. 
Ultimately, the doctrine of equivalents, much like nuisance law, 
consists of a hybrid regime of exclusion and governance. Nonetheless, 
the doctrine of equivalents since Warner-Jenkinson has been pushed 
further toward formalism and rules-based adjudication.132 
II. ANOTHER INTERPRETATION OF NUISANCE AND THE 
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS 
This section adopts another interpretive approach, based on 
economist Ronald Coase’ seminal article The Problem of Social Cost, 
and incorporates related annotations and extensions by other scholars, 
to explore the issue put forward by Professor Smith: the similarity 
between nuisance law and the doctrine of equivalents. 
A. Basic Theory: Coase Theorem, Pareto Optimality, and 
Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency 
In The Problem of Social Cost, Coase uses an example of nuisance 
law to illustrate his critique of the externality theory. Later, the 
theoretical literature on nuisance law, having been heavily influenced 
by law and economics, rather naturally started the discussion with 
Coase’s theoretical insight.133 
																																								 																				
 130. Id.; id. at 39 n.8 (for the rule of claim vitiation). 
 131. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 740-41 
(2002). The three exceptions to prosecution history estoppel are: (i) equivalents unforeseeable at 
the time of the amendment, (ii) the rationale underlying the amendment bearing merely a 
tangential relation to the equivalent in question, and (iii) some other reason “suggesting that the 
patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in 
question.” Id.  
 132. See generally John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 
771, 792 (2003) (“Patent jurisprudence increasingly reflects a trend towards adjudicative rule 
formalism.”). 
 133. See generally Christopher Essert, Nuisance and the Normative Boundaries of 
Ownership, 52 TULSA L. REV. 85, 92 (2016) (Coase placed nuisance law at the center of law and 
economics); Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 977, 
979 n.11 (1996) (Coase used nuisance law to illustrate his critique of the externality theory); 
Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individuals in 
Law and Economics, 92 GA. L. REV. 75, 93 (2004) (Coase challenged the Piguvian approach to 
externalities).  
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One of Coase’s major points is the reciprocal nature of harm: if 
two conflicting uses of a resource exist, the nonowner’s use does not 
necessarily cause damage to the owner.134 This occurs because if the 
law enjoins the nonowner’s use, the nonowner could suffer loss; 
moreover, if the law allows the nonowner’s use, the owner could suffer 
loss.135 Since either party could suffer loss, the question then becomes 
which party the law chooses to sacrifice in order to avoid the more 
serious harm; the law could choose to permit the nonowner’s use and 
let the owner suffer, or vice versa.136 Therefore, it is not necessarily the 
case that someone may not use another’s property. The reciprocal 
nature of harm presupposes the separation of ownership with some 
privileges of use. 
Another major point is that, if the world were frictionless (i.e., 
without transaction costs),137 parties would solve use conflicts by 
themselves through their bargaining and contracting, and society as a 
whole would be better off.138 In a frictionless society where transaction 
costs are absent, “Pareto optimality or economic efficiency will occur 
regardless of the initial entitlement.”139 In other words, if the market is 
well-functioning, resource allocation would reach the point of 
equilibrium through the operation of private bargaining, regardless of 
how the law defines the rights and duties initially.140 
Scholarly commentary reveals two important corollaries of the 
Coase theorem. First, given the initial allocation of property rights and 
under certain conditions (including the condition of a world without 
transaction costs), private bargaining would move resource allocation 
																																								 																				
 134. See Essert, supra note 133, at 88-92 (restating and critiquing the reciprocal nature of 
harm).  
 135. Gregory C. Keating, Nuisance as a Strict Liability Wrong, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 2 (2012).  
 136. Kenneth R. Vogel, The Coase Theorem and California Animal Trespass Law, 16 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 149, 150 (1987); Essert, supra note 133, at 89.  
 137. Brett Frischmann & Evan Selinger, Utopia?: A Technologically Determined World of 
Frictionless Transactions, Optimized Production, and Maximal Happiness, 64 UCLA L. REV. 
DISCOURSE 372, 375-76 (2016) (Coase’s frictionless world).  
 138. Herbert Hovenkamp, Fractured Markets and Legal Institutions, 100 IOWA L. REV. 617, 
619 (2015) (private bargaining would solve the problem of conflicting use); Parchomovsky & 
Siegelman, supra note 133, at 93.  
 139. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 23, at 1094-95. See Calabresi, supra note 12, at 1215.   
 140. Coase, supra note 5, at 6; Harold Demsetz, R.H. Coase and the Neoclassical Model of 
the Economic System, 54 J.L. & ECON. S7, S11 (2011) (agreeing to Coase’s neoclassical claim 
under the assumption that the transaction cost is zero). See R.H. Coase, The Federal 
Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 26-27 (1959) (discussing an example within the 
case Sturges v. Bridgman, [1879] 11 Ch. D. 852, in which private bargaining leads to 
equilibrium); Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 (1982).   
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to an equilibrium.141 This is known as the efficiency thesis.142 Second, 
the agreement by the parties would move the resource allocation to an 
equilibrium regardless of how the law assigns rights and duties 
initially. This is known as the invariance thesis.143 According to Coase, 
under the condition that bargaining is costless and with an initial 
definition of property rights, parties would reallocate resources by their 
consent and reach an efficient outcome.144 
However, the market requires costs, and Coase was the first to 
admit it.145 After transaction costs are considered, the parties may not 
transact and reach an agreement as easily.146 Even if a rearrangement 
of property rights could cause an increase in the value of production, 
the parties’ failure to bargain because of the transaction costs may 
require the government (through legislature, courts, or administrative 
agencies) to rearrange rights for them, and the initial allocation of rights 
also matters.147 “In these conditions the initial delimitation of legal 
rights does have an effect on the efficiency with which the economic 
system operates. One arrangement of rights may bring about a greater 
value of production than any other.”148 
																																								 																				
 141. See Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & ECON. 427, 427 
(1972) (the preconditions of the Coase theorem include full competition, zero transaction cost, 
full information, etc.); Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthews L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some 
Experimental Test, 25 J.L. & ECON. 73, 73 (1982) (identifying eight preconditions of the Coase 
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 142. For the meaning of the efficiency thesis and the invariance thesis, see Hovenkamp, 
supra note 141, at 785 (stating the two sub-theses under the Coase theorem); Cooter, supra note 
140, at 15; Regan, supra note 141, at 427 (restating the efficiency thesis and the invariance thesis); 
Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 141, at 73 (combining the efficiency thesis and the invariance 
thesis and proposing the preconditions to Coase theorem); Hovenkamp, supra note 138, at 628-
29.  
 143. See Demsetz, supra note 140, at S11; Cooter, supra note 140, at 15 (discrediting the 
invariance thesis); Vogel, supra note 136, at 151 (criticizing the invariance thesis); Calabresi, 
supra note 12, at 1222-23. James M. Buchanan calls the invariance thesis allocational neutrality. 
See J. M. Buchanan, The Coase Theorem and the Theory of the State, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 579, 
580, 584-85 (1973) (allocational neutrality means that if the parties can voluntarily transact under 
ideal conditions, the initial allocation of property rights is irrelevant). See also Hovenkamp, supra 
note 138, at 628. 
 144. Coase, supra note 5, at 8.  
 145. Id. at 15. See Demsetz, supra note 140, at S11 (stating that “[b]read does not fall like 
manna on the dinner table. It comes at a cost. Similarly, transactions are not free.”); Parchomovsky 
& Siegelman, supra note 133, at 94.  
 146. See Demsetz, supra note 140, at S12 (the existence of transaction costs could cause the 
inefficiency of the market). 
 147. Hovenkamp, supra note 138, at 619 (“[T]ransaction costs make a legal system 
important to social ordering.”).  
 148. Coase, supra note 5, at 16. See Cooter, supra note 140, at 18; Hovenkamp, supra note 
141, at 809.  
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Therefore, in the realistic setting where a transaction requires 
costs, the government could, subject to some conditions, attempt to 
rearrange rights to approximate what the parties would have agreed to 
in a zero-cost transaction.149 To restate the proposition, based on a 
certain initial definition of rights, the government could rearrange and 
thus change the initial definition of rights if doing so would result in an 
increase in the value of production.150 However, the government’s best 
effort to approximate the equilibrium would not be the same, because 
true equilibrium is defined by the parties’ consent in no-cost 
bargaining, which is an “unreachable goal.”151 When the costs of 
government intervention—as well the motive and capacity of courts or 
agencies—are considered, no guarantee exists that the governmental 
rearrangement of rights would approach an ideal result, rather than a 
“false optimum.”152 
Although Coase does not specifically identify the concept of 
equilibrium he used in Social Cost, some commentators have identified 
the equilibrium concept here as Pareto optimality.153 Thus, it is 
appropriate to introduce Pareto optimality in the context of this paper. 
The discussion on Pareto optimality typically starts with the scenario 
of a bilateral monopoly:154 Assuming that a society consists only of two 
persons A and B, and only of two types of consumption goods x and y, 
all the consumption goods (x and y) are distributed to A and B.155 
Pareto optimality is a situation containing no Pareto superiority, such 
that a situation with no further distribution of resources and goods 
would make one individual better without making another individual 
worse.156 In other words, Pareto optimality is a status without resource 
																																								 																				
 149. See Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules – a 
Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 69 (1968) (arguing that the aim of governmental relocation of 
resources is an attempt to approximate the result of zero-cost bargaining as closely as possible 
and at low cost).  
 150. By contrast, some commentators hold that Coasean analysis suggests that little or no 
government intervention would be the best approach. Calabresi, however, disagrees, and contends 
that the Coasean analysis can be used to justify government actions. Id. at 73.  
 151. Id. at 69.  
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. at 68; Regan, supra note 141, at 428-29; Vogel, supra note 136, at 151; Hoffman & 
Spitzer, supra note 141, at 75-76. 
 154. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 17 (4th ed. 2004). 
 155. The scenario that Coase presupposed is akin to this situation, where two persons vie 
for control of a scarce resource. See Demsetz, supra note 140, at S12.  
 156. See Barbara White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72 IOWA 
L. REV. 577, 585 (1987); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 23, at 1094 (describing Pareto 
optimality), 1095-96 (different initial allocations of rights result in different Pareto optimalities); 
Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOSFTRA L. REV. 509, 513 
(1980) (the relation of Pareto superiority to Pareto optimality). 
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misallocation, typically represented with an Edgeworth box shown in 
Figure 1: 
 
Consider the initial allocation of property rights as (x, y), and the 
new allocation of rights, achieved either by private bargaining or by 
government intervention, as (x’, y’). The parties’ bargaining, assuming 
transaction costs are zero or low, is the most efficient means of moving 
from (x, y) to (x’, y’), which is true Pareto optimality and an 
equilibrium. Substitutes for transaction (such as some type of 
government intervention) have costs, so the optimal result they achieve 
may approximate, but not necessarily be the same as, true optimality 
(x’, y’).157 
Torts on property rights can be seen as unilaterally taking some 
uses of a resource owned by another.158 B’s conduct causing damage to 
A’s use of property (thus reducing the value x) can be seen as B 
unilaterally taking more of A’s use of property (x) than was originally 
distributed between A and B. Therefore, B’s conduct deviates from the 
original equilibrium (x, y) and violates the unanimous consent 
requirement of the Pareto ethic.159 If the parties were voluntarily 
																																								 																				
 157. See Calabresi, supra note 149, at 69 (asking “have we instead approached a false 
optimum by a series of games which are not worth the candles used?”).  
 158. For the concept of the terms “thing” and “use” here, see Henry E. Smith, Property as 
the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1693 (2012). 
 159. For the principle of consent under the Pareto ethic, see Richard A. Posner, The Ethical 
and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
487, 488 (1980).  
Figure 1: Edgeworth Box	
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transacting, B would be obliged to pay more of her use of property (y) 
to obtain more of A’s use of property (x), such that A and B would 
agree to a new allocation of property rights (x’, y’), which represents a 
new Pareto optimality.160 In the end, if B’s conduct has not changed the 
constraint on the decision (i.e., a set of transaction costs),161 the court 
would enforce the original property right, refuse to create a new 
allocation, and demand that B return to the original allocation of 
resources (x, y),162 which represents the original Pareto optimality prior 
to B’s conduct.163 
However, if B’s conduct had caused the constraint on the decision 
to be changed—for instance, if B’s conduct were innovative164—the 
court would be willing to rearrange property rights to achieve a new 
Pareto optimality. As Coase shows, an increase in the value of 
production can trigger a rearrangement of rights. 
In a world with positive transaction costs, Coase adds two more 
conditions:165 First, because rearranging rights requires costs, only 
when the increase in value resulting from the rearrangement is greater 
than the associated costs would a rearrangement of rights occur.166 
Second, rearrangement by the parties bargaining privately and 
rearrangement by government intervention are alternative 
mechanisms.167 The cost of private bargaining must be greater than the 
cost of government invention for the government to step in to rearrange 
rights.168 
In summary, if a governmental rearrangement of property rights 
(including by courts) can result in an increased value of production, 
and the increased value is greater than the costs incurred during this 
																																								 																				
 160. See Hovenkamp, supra note 141, at 627 (in Coasean markets, moving resources 
requires the unanimous consent of the relevant parties).  
 161. See Calabresi, supra note 12, at 1212 (given a set of transaction costs, Pareto optimality 
will always and immediately be reached).  
 162. Otherwise it would not be a Pareto improvement, because B would be made better off 
but A would be made worse off. See Posner, supra note 159, at 488. 
 163. This is because the status quo—here, the state of affairs before B’s conduct—is a Pareto 
optimality until a new, better, and achievable arrangement is found. Calabresi, supra note 12, at 
1215-16. See Mark A. Geistfeld, Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts: Carrying Calabresi 
Further, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 166 (2014).  
 164. An innovation can shift the Pareto frontier outward and thus change the utility 
possibility frontier. Calabresi, supra note 12, at 1212.  
 165. Coase, supra note 5, at 15-18. 
 166. See Hovenkamp, supra note 138, at 623 (for a transactional or nontransactional move 
of resources, if the transaction cost is higher than the increased value, the move would not occur).  
 167. Coase, supra note 5, at 17-18.  
 168. Calabresi, supra note 149, at 71-72 (using public highways and rubber bumpers as 
examples); Frischmann & Selinger, supra note 137, at 375-76 (using a frictionless world as the 
baseline to evaluate and compare different mechanisms in the real world).   
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process, which are lower than the costs of private bargaining, then the 
government can intervene to rearrange the initial definition of property 
rights. This ex post redefinition of property rights adjusts the uses of 
resources belonging to the relevant parties. Finally, the result of this 
adjustment of property rights by the government could approach, but 
would still not be the same as, the result of the parties’ bargaining and 
contracting, which is the only means of producing true optimality. 
Therefore, the increase in the value of production is key; with 
certain conditions, such an increase could result in the rearrangement 
of rights by the government. However, “increase in the value of 
production” must be defined. 
Calabresi presents two means for welfare improvement centered 
on the concept of a Pareto frontier: moving “along the frontier” and 
“shifting the frontier outward.”169 The Pareto frontier (production 
possibilities frontier) is a set of feasible allocations given a certain 
technological level.170 Moving along the frontier is one “in which there 
are winners and losers,” and it improves well-being so long as the 
winner wins more than the loser loses.171 Shifting the frontier outward 
as a result of innovations or technological advances “create[s] winners 
and may or may not create losers as well.”172 
Both moving along the Pareto frontier and shifting the frontier 
outward can increase the value of production. The innovations that can 
shift the Pareto frontier outward include not only material and 
technological ones but also “moral, aesthetic, and altruistic” ones.173 
For instance, Geistfeld argues that legal innovations, such as an 
innovation in the compensatory tort system, can shift the Pareto frontier 
outward from the status quo.174 Nonetheless, as Calabresi notes, 
improving well-being by shifting the frontier outward is a much less 
discussed topic in the economic literature than moving to or along the 
frontier.175 
In reality, as a principle of unanimous consent under ideal 
conditions, Pareto optimality cannot be easily achieved. It is argued 
that most legal institutions implement Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, a 
																																								 																				
 169. Calabresi, supra note 12, at 1230-31. 
 170. See Geistfeld, supra note 163, at 166 (noting that transactions costs and existing 
technology define the Pareto frontier); Matthew Dimick, Should the Law Do Anything About 
Economic Inequality?, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 13, 33 (2016) (discussing 
technologically feasible allocations located within and on the Pareto frontier).  
 171. Calabresi, supra note 12, at 1221, 1229-30. 
 172. Id. at 1230-32.  
 173. Id. at 1235.  
 174. Geistfeld, supra note 163, at 168, 187-88.  
 175. Calabresi, supra note 12, at 1227, 1235-36. 
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criterion of hypothetical consent under nonideal conditions.176 Judge 
Posner observes that “when an economist says that free trade or 
competition or the control of pollution or some other policy or state of 
the world is efficient, nine times out of ten he means Kaldor-Hicks 
efficient.”177 Matthew Adler also observes that Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency dominates administrative regulation.178 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, also known as “potential Pareto 
superiority,”179 is a less austere concept of efficiency.180 It is a criterion 
of hypothetical compensation: it requires only that “the increase in 
value be sufficiently large that the losers could be fully 
compensated”181 and is ultimately not concerned with whether the 
winners actually do compensate the losers.182 Serving as the basis of 
cost–benefit analysis,183 the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is “the relationship 
between the aggregate benefits of a situation and the aggregate costs of 
the situation,” “without regard to how those costs and benefits are 
distributed among different individuals.”184 
An obvious problem of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is that, even if a 
reallocation promotes the collective welfare, the losers are left to bear 
the loss.185 Though theoretically the winners could compensate the 
losers, in reality when the law assigns rights to the winners, the winners 
have no incentive to compensate the losers.186 By contrast, the Pareto 
criterion requires that the winners actually compensate the losers.187 
The governmental ex post rearrangement of rights can be seen as a type 
of compulsory exchange, approximating the outcome of private 
																																								 																				
 176. W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 80 (4th ed. 
2005); Posner, supra note 159, at 495; Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 170 (1999).  
 177. POSNER, supra note 40, at 13.  
 178. Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of 
Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 244 (2000). 
 179. Posner, supra note 159, at 491; POSNER, supra note 40, at 13 (arguing that Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency has the potential of becoming Pareto optimal if the losers are fully compensated 
by the winners).  
 180. Geistfeld, supra note 163, at 170.  
 181. Posner, supra note 159, at 491 (emphasis added).  
 182. Dimick, supra note 170, at 46 (stating that if the compensation does occur, then the 
situation also satisfies Pareto efficiency).  
 183. Geistfeld, supra note 163, at 170.  
 184. Adler, supra note 178, at 245 n.13.  
 185. Calabresi, supra note 12, at 1223 (observing that an involuntary and uncompensated 
Kaldor-Hicks improvement is not really an “improvement”).  
 186. Jules Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of 
Richard Posner's the Economics of Justice, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1982) (observing that, 
following Posner’s approach, assigning the right to the polluter would free the polluter from the 
obligation to purchase the right to pollute from its neighbors). 
 187. Calabresi, supra note 12, at 1222-23.  
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bargaining and contracting. In other words, based on the initial 
definition of property rights, the parties can bargain by themselves to 
reach an equivalency, or—as a less costly alternative—the government 
can arrange their rights, mimicking188 but not necessarily attaining the 
equivalency reached by private bargaining.189 Although the 
governmental reallocation may not be identical to the optimality 
reached by the parties themselves, the Pareto criterion that requires the 
losers to actually be compensated would bring the outcome closer to 
true equilibrium than the Kaldor-Hicks criterion would.190 
B. Explaining Neighboring Relations 
1. General Principles 
In a world with zero transaction costs, the law cannot only clearly 
define the rights and let the parties voluntarily transact; if the 
transaction cost is too high, contracting may not begin or be 
consummated. The situation may therefore require the court to allocate 
the rights among the parties directly. This type of reallocation of rights 
and duties occurs across the boundaries of property.191 Ellickson 
proposes handling externality by redefining property rights—that is, 
cross-boundary allocation of rights and duties—and the law of 
nuisance is an example of this approach.192 
If (x, y) represents the initial allocation of rights between two 
neighboring owners A and B, the initial definition of property rights is 
A(x, y) and B(x, y). The assumption here is that all of A’s use of 
property (x) belongs to A, and all of B’s use of property (y) belongs to 
B. This allocation of rights can be termed the “geometric-box 
allocation of rights,”193 or the Blackstonian default package.194 
However, sometimes between neighboring owners, even if A 
seems to conduct his affairs within the boundaries of his property, he 
still takes some of the use of B’s property. For instance, even if A’s 
house is completely constructed on A’s land, A still needs the lateral 
																																								 																				
 188. See Coleman, supra note 186, at 1108 (stating Posner’s thesis that the law should 
mimic the market). 
 189. Coase, supra note 5, at 18 (claiming that governmental regulation may or may not 
increase efficiency).  
 190. Coleman, supra note 186, at 1109 (noting that it is highly unlikely that assigning rights 
by the Kaldor-Hicks criterion would produce Pareto optimal outcomes). 
 191. Ellickson, supra note 21, at 683; Smith, supra note 3, at 1002 (cross-boundary 
allocation of rights and duties based on the relative value of two uses).  
 192. Ellickson, supra note 21, at 683.  
 193. Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 55 (1987) 
(describing the “’geometric-box’ allocation of rights”). 
 194. Smith, supra note 3, at 1002.  
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support of B’s land. In other words, A still takes one use of B’s land—
the lateral support.195 A’s domain of control contains part of B’s use of 
property (y); likewise, B’s domain of control contains part of A’s use 
of property (x). Thus, the initial allocation of rights between two 
neighboring owners should be A(x, y) and B(x, y). Here, x and y are 
each more than or equal to zero. (Henceforth, this paper assumes a 
scenario in which B interferes with A’s use of property. Thus, A may 
be referred to as the plaintiff, and B may be referred to as the 
defendant.) 
Nonetheless, quoting the tort law scholar Prosser, Coase states, “a 
person may make use of his own property or … conduct his own affairs 
at the expense of some harm to his neighbors.”196 For instance, B may 
conduct his activity within the boundaries of his property, but his 
activity may cause damages to his neighbor A. In other words, B by his 
conduct takes some of A’s use of property, and by his unilateral 
conduct B reduces the amount of A’s property use from x to x’. A is 
damaged by B’s conduct since the new amount of property use (x’) is 
less than the original amount of his property use (x). Some of A’s 
property use is taken by B. If the parties could voluntarily transact (for 
instance, if the transaction cost is zero or extremely low), the parties 
would adjust B’s amount of property use from y to y’. In other words, 
B should pay some of his property use to A in order to compensate A 
for his loss. Ultimately, they would arrive at a new allocation of 
property use (x’, y’), which would become the new equilibrium. In 
summary, based on the initial allocation of property rights, the parties 
conduct transactions by contracting and reach equilibrium. 
According to the Pareto test, if B’s activity takes more of A’s use 
of property, B must compensate A. If the parties cannot reach an 
agreement by themselves, the law can simulate the result of the parties’ 
possible transaction and distribute the reimbursement to A. The court 
would determine the value that B takes from A’s use of property (that 
is, the reduction of the value of x), and determine the value that should 
be subtracted from B’s use of property (y) and given to A to 
compensate A for the loss of property use (x).197 After this process, the 
benefits are raised for all, but the parties are still in the optimal status. 
																																								 																				
 195. Ellickson, supra note 21, at 719; Smith, supra note 48, at S469 (exclusion does not 
mean to control all the use of the resources); SMITH & HAND, supra note 4, § 4:2 (neighboring 
landowners have the mutual obligation of lateral support).  
 196. Coase, supra note 5, at 19.  
 197. More precisely, the value of y that should be deducted may not be only the value of the 
reduction in x. This is because if B profits from using of A’s property, the court may have to 
distribute the profits as the fruits of their “cooperation.” See Regan, supra note 141, at 429 
(benefits of cooperation should be divided in a variable-sum game).  
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In brief, based on the initial allocation of property rights, the 
government conducts a cross-boundary reallocation of rights. This ex 
post allocation of rights deviates from the original “geometric-box 
allocation of rights” or the Blackstonian default package.198 
Nonetheless some legal rules allow B to obtain more of A’s use 
of property without compensating A. These rules reduce only the value 
of x (A’s use of property) but make no change to the value of y (B’s 
use of property). Coase, still quoting Prosser, states, “The world must 
have factories, smelters, oil refineries, noisy machinery and blasting, 
even at the expense of some inconvenience to those in the vicinity, and 
the plaintiff may be required to accept some not unreasonable 
discomfort for the general good.”199 These rules follow Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency. 
2. Nuisance Law as an Example 
Private nuisance is an interference in which the defendant’s 
conduct causes damage to the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of land.200 
In other words, by a unilateral act, the defendant takes part of the 
plaintiff’s use of the land (represented by x), thus reducing the value of 
x. 
To determine whether a private nuisance exists, the court 
considers factors such as the substantiality and the reasonableness of 
the defendant’s interference with the plaintiff’s enjoyment and use.201 
Reasonableness is determined with reference to the totality of 
circumstances surrounding the defendant’s conduct.202 Courts often use 
a list of factors to scrutinize this conduct; some refer to the severity of 
harm (such as the extent and the character of harm), whereas some 
evaluate the utility of the defendant’s conduct (such as the social value 
of the defendant’s primary purpose).203 This approach is championed 
																																								 																				
 198. Sterk, supra note 193, at 55. Nonetheless it should be noted that the government’s 
second allocation (in contrast to the initial allocation) of rights may either compensate or not 
compensate the loser. Cross-boundary allocation of rights was considered to be incompatible with 
the laissez-faire distribution of property rights. Nonetheless, Ellickson believes that in some 
circumstances, to depart from the ad coelum rule and distribute property rights across the 
boundaries is a more equitable and efficient approach to dealing with externalities caused by 
property uses. Ellickson, supra note 21, at 719.  
 199. Coase, supra note 5, at 19-20.  
 200. See Claeys, supra note 27, at 1419. 
 201. See id. (listing causation, harm, and reasonableness as the elements of nuisance 
liability). 
 202. HERBERT HOVENKAMP & SHELDON F. KURTZ, PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW 424 (6th 
ed. 2005).  
 203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).  
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by the Second Restatement of Torts.204 The court should make a case-
by-case evaluation of the total benefit and total loss caused by the 
defendant’s use of land.205 
In terms of allocative efficiency, reasonableness means that the 
total benefit of the defendant’s act that takes the neighboring owner’s 
use of property outweighs the loss suffered by the plaintiff from such 
taking. If the defendant’s act is reasonable, the court should allow it 
and realign the parties’ property rights, giving rise to a new allocation 
(x’, y’). If the defendant’s act is unreasonable, which means the loss it 
causes outweighs its benefit, the court should enjoin the defendant’s 
act and return to the original allocation between the parties (x, y). 
Nonetheless, one factor for determining reasonableness, the 
character of the neighborhood, represents a Pareto optimal point 
previously reached when the party purchased the property within the 
neighborhood.206 The character of the neighborhood is the threshold of 
liability in nuisance law, which means that an activity considered 
normal in the neighborhood should not be treated as a nuisance (but it 
may be a nuisance at another place).207 This rule, known as the locality 
rule, makes the character of the neighborhood a decisive factor of, or 
even a defense to, the liability of nuisance.208 
Ellickson argues that the character of the neighborhood as a 
threshold of liability imposes a restriction on internalization of 
externalities suffered by neighboring landowners.209 The concept of 
normalcy (or neighborliness) refers to the standard of the contemporary 
community and is empirically established. In a community, people 
often have a rough consensus on normal conduct, such as what 
constitutes normal land uses.210 This local consensus shows that the 
locality rule relies on a Pareto optimal point already reached among the 
																																								 																				
 204. See id. §§ 827-28 (1977) (providing major factors to be weighed).  
 205. Smith, supra note 3, at 1003. See Ellickson, supra note 21, at 748 (making out a prima 
facie nuisance case should not entitle a defendant to remedies); Epstein, supra note 10, at 61; 
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 207. Smith, supra note 3, at 1002-03. 
 208. Bove v. Donner-Hanner Coke Co., 258 N.Y.S. 229, 232 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932); Reed 
v. Cook Constr. Co., Inc., 336 So.2d 724, 725 (Miss. 1976); Smith, supra note 3, at 1002-03; 
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 209. Ellickson, supra note 21, at 728.  
 210. Id. at 729. See Wade v. Miller, 73 N.E. 849 (Mass. 1905) (the odor from henhouses 
and the cackling of hens and crowing of roosters in an agricultural area); Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (“[A] pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.”); 
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neighbors regarding what is normal; normal or above-normal conduct 
does not entail liability. The established Pareto optimal point thus 
serves as a defense to liability. In addition, imposing liability only on 
subnormal conduct lowers administrative costs.211 
Epstein’s “implicit in-kind compensation” further explains why 
the locality rule invokes a formerly established Pareto optimal point as 
a defense to nuisance liability.212 He explained the “implicit in-kind 
compensation” as follows: “the uniformity of activities throughout any 
given area makes it highly likely that benefits obtained by having each 
person inflict limited nuisances upon the others will more than offset 
the losses sustained from having to tolerate the nuisances inflicted by 
others.”213 A landowner in the community has implicitly received 
compensation, either from reciprocal harms in a “live and let live” 
manner or from the price of land purchase, for the loss he suffers. As 
Epstein states, it is “unlikely that any person will buy land in heavily 
industrialized regions with the idea of using it for residential 
property.”214 Thus neighborliness or normalcy expresses a consensus 
among the people in the community, who have implicitly consented to 
the character of the neighborhood at some point in time; the consensus 
thus becomes the basis for a defense to liability. 
The requirement of substantial harm means that if the plaintiff 
suffers from slight or petty inconveniences, the level of interference is 
insufficient to impose liability.215 The element of substantial harm can 
be explained by cost–benefit balancing and allocative efficiency. 
Recall that when the costs outweigh the benefits, the court does not 
reallocate rights between the parties. In addition, Ellickson mentions 
the requirement of substantial harm: “If plaintiffs are allowed to bring 
suits for trivial damages, the administrative costs involved are likely to 
exceed the efficiency gains of permitting such suits.”216 In other words, 
after administrative costs are considered, the benefits arising from the 
plaintiff claiming rights in situations of petty annoyances is outweighed 
by the costs, which include the costs to both parties and the judicial 
costs of making and enforcing decisions.217 In contrast to Ellickson’s 
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focus on the costs of litigation, Rabin’s analysis focuses on balancing 
the utilities of the defendant’s conduct itself: “The substantiality of an 
interference depends on the benefits as well as the burdens that the 
plaintiff’s land receives from the defendant’s land.”218 
The Second Restatement of Torts explicitly endorses the approach 
in which the court in nuisance cases weighs the related benefits and 
costs.219 In nuisance cases, the governance strategy is evident not only 
at the stage of liability, but at the stage of remedies as well. The 
governance strategy employed at the liability stage is shown by 
nuisance law’s standard-based, rather than rules-based, approach, as 
evidenced by the court’s implicit or explicit cost–benefit balancing.220 
The governance at the stage of remedies indicates that modern nuisance 
law allows the court to shun an “all-or-nothing” decision that merely 
allows or enjoins the defendant’s conduct.221 Even if the court finds a 
nuisance, it may choose not to ban the defendant’s use completely but 
to revise the defendant’s future course of conduct.222 The court may 
choose not to enjoin a nuisance but—following Calabresi and 
Melamed’s Rule 2—require the defendant to pay permanent 
damages.223 This type of judgment is judicial mimicking of the Pareto 
optimality that the parties could have reached; in other words, it is a 
type of judicially coerced cooperation. 
III. EXPLAINING THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS 
The analysis of relations between neighbors focuses on whether 
the user takes the proprietor’s use of property, and how to compare the 
benefits of such taking against its costs so that the overall welfare is 
increased by the taking. The analysis of the doctrine of equivalents in 
patent law also focuses on whether the accused infringer takes the use 
of the patent owner’s claimed invention, but it requires showing a 
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different type of welfare improvement to justify the accused infringer’s 
taking and to immunize it from liability. 
The determination of equivalency is divided into two parts: 
factual equivalency (the test for equivalency) and legal defenses.224 
Factual equivalency is the determination of whether the claimed 
invention and the accused product or process are equivalent.225 
Generally speaking, factual equivalency can be determined by the 
insubstantial differences test,226 the tripartite function-way-result 
test,227 or the known interchangeability test.228 In Warner-Jenkinson, 
the Supreme Court opined that for determining equivalency, “[T]he 
particular linguistic framework used is less important than whether the 
test is probative of the essential inquiry: Does the accused product or 
process contain elements identical or equivalent to each claimed 
element of the patented invention?”229 This “essential inquiry” is 
whether the defendant has taken the use of the claimed invention. The 
use of the “thing” taken here is the inventive concept of the plaintiff’s 
patent. As one commentator notes, the substantial differences test and 
the tripartite test represent “a rough attempt to identify whether the 
accused activity has made use of the inventive concept that the patentee 
was attempting to set out in the patent claim.”230 
In addition, the evidence of the defense to equivalency is not 
necessarily related to similarity with the technology in question. The 
evidence of some important defenses, such as the prior art bar or 
prosecution history estoppel, is different from the evidence concerning 
the comparison of factual equivalency. A successful assertion of one of 
these defenses bars the infringement by equivalents, regardless of 
whether the accused product or process is factually similar to the 
claimed invention. This is because, as explained in the later sections of 
this paper, these legal defenses are based on a policy rationale different 
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from that of factual equivalency. These two sets of rules are not of the 
same nature with respect to the functions they serve. 
A. Determining Factual Equivalency 
The inquiry of factual equivalency is to determine whether the 
accused product or process “used” the inventive concept of the claimed 
invention.231 The Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson stated that the 
“essential inquiry” is whether “the accused product or process 
contain[s] elements identical or equivalent to” every claimed element 
of the plaintiff’s patent.232 Different “linguistic frameworks” (denoting 
methods of equivalent analysis) are only the means to answer this 
essential question.233 If we treat the inventive concept of a patent as the 
“thing,”234 patent infringement occurs when the use of the thing owned 
by the patentee was taken by another. In an equivalent analysis, if the 
accused product or process is not substantially different from the 
elements of the claimed invention, the patentee’s use of the thing was 
taken by the infringer. By contrast, if the accused product or process is 
substantially different from the claimed invention, the accused 
infringer did not take the patentee’s use of the thing. The test of 
substantial differences is therefore a method of determining whether 
the alleged infringer has taken the patentee’s use of a thing (her 
inventive concept). 
In determining whether a substantial difference exists, courts 
often ask whether the defendant has made a substantial change to the 
technical means.235 If the means have been changed substantially, the 
claimed invention and the accused product or process are not in fact 
equivalent. However, they are equivalent if the change is 
insignificant.236 For example, in the classic case Sanitary Refrigerator 
Co. v. Winters, the Supreme Court made the following statement: “A 
close copy which seeks to use the substance of the invention, and, 
although showing some change in form and position, uses substantially 
the same devices, performing precisely the same effects with no change 
in principle, constitutes an infringement.”237 The Federal Circuit also 
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reasoned in London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co. that infringement by 
equivalents arises “where an infringer, instead of inventing around a 
patent by making a substantial change, merely makes an insubstantial 
change, essentially misappropriating or even ‘stealing’ the patented 
invention . . .”238 
Thus, the concept of substantial differences may encompass two 
facets, one addressing the substantial identity of the accused product or 
process to the claimed invention,239 the other addressing the substantial 
change made by the accused infringer. Though these two facets facially 
seem the same, they have different connotations. The concept of 
substantial identity measures the degree to which the patentee’s use of 
the thing—the inventive concept of the claimed invention—is taken by 
the alleged infringer.240 As stated by the Federal Circuit in Hilton 
Davis, substantial identify refers to a situation “where a device is a 
copy of the thing described by the patentee, ‘either without variation, 
or with such variations as are consistent with its being in substance the 
same thing.’”241 
However, the concept of substantial change measures how far the 
accused infringer altered the means of the claimed invention, and 
whether such an alteration is considered significant or miniscule.242 
Thus, the finding of substantial change measures the degree to which 
the accused infringer, though perhaps a user of the patentee’s inventive 
concept, has made contributions to the technology in question. A 
finding that the change was insubstantial indicates that the infringer’s 
contribution to the art was minimal.243 Thus, these two concepts are 
proxies for different activities of the accused infringer: substantial 
identity measures the degree of taking, and substantial change 
measures the contribution to the art in question. Courts often consider 
it as a matter of course that a finding of substantial change and a finding 
of substantial identity negate each other.244 
Making substantial change, for example, by successfully 
designing around a patent,245 could shift the Pareto frontier outward, 
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because innovation is one major approach to shifting or tilting the 
production possibility frontier.246 However, if the accused infringer 
merely makes use of the inventive concept of the patented invention, 
without modification or with only insignificant modification, even 
though it is possible that the benefit to the infringer could be greater 
than the loss to the patentee, the situation is merely moving along the 
frontier. If the patentee is not compensated, the result could fall to the 
southwest side of the Pareto frontier. This situation is what the Supreme 
Court termed “fraud on a patent” in Graver Tank.247 The doctrine of 
equivalence ensures that this situation falls within the ambit of the 
patent right.248 
The purpose of the patent system is to promote the progress of 
science and technology. The U.S. Constitution lists “to promote the 
Progress of … useful Arts” as the goal of the patent system.249 Given 
this purpose, the only case where patent law reallocates rights is where 
the actor promotes the progress of technology. In cases where the actor 
seeks only a redistribution of wealth based on existing technology, 
patent law does not reallocate rights. In contrast to property law, both 
cases where the production value is increased, whether “moving along 
the Pareto frontier” or “moving the Pareto frontier outward,” can 
trigger the government’s reallocation of rights. Patent law reallocates 
rights only in cases of shifting the Pareto frontier outward. In cases that 
only move along the Pareto frontier, patent law does not reallocate 
rights but requires a return to the original property right. If the parties 
are seeking wealth redistribution under the same technological level, 
the law requires the parties to reach voluntary agreements by 
contracting. 
The primary test for equivalency is substantial difference, because 
substantial difference means that the accused infringer has made a 
substantial innovation rather than staying on the same Pareto frontier 
to seek redistribution. Also, in cases where the parties remain on the 
same frontier and the taker does not reimburse the patent holder, the 
result may even fall to the southwest side of the Pareto frontier. 
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Other major tests of equivalency can be explained by the same 
rationale. The tripartite test is only one means of determining 
substantial difference, and its principle is the same as that of the 
substantial differences test (i.e., distinguishing whether the accused 
infringer is seeking redistribution based on the same technology or 
whether substantial innovation has been made to shift the Pareto 
frontier outward).250 The principle is the same for interchangeability: 
the fact that, at the time of infringement, one skilled in the art does not 
know that the two elements are interchangeable, indicates that the 
accused infringer has made innovative contributions to the 
technology.251 The test of substantial change measures the degree of 
the accused infringer’s contribution; the more substantial the change, 
the larger the contribution, and the further the Pareto frontier is moved 
outward.252 No matter what test the court uses—whether substantial 
differences, the tripartite test, or interchangeability—the real point, as 
pronounced by the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson, is to 
determine whether the accused product or process is identical or 
equivalent to the claimed patent elements.253 In other words, these tests 
are all designed to determine whether the accused infringer took the 
use of the inventive concept of the patent in question. Purely taking the 
inventive concept of a patent without making a substantial change falls 
under “moving along the Pareto frontier,” rather than “shifting the 
frontier outward.” 
In patent infringement, to move along the Pareto frontier is to 
redistribute the same resource: the inventive concept of the claimed 
invention. This redistribution could improve well-being if done 
through transactions, but it must be premised on respecting property 
rights and voluntary contracting by the parties. If someone takes the 
inventive concept of the claimed invention without making a 
substantial change, the infringer profits from the taking while making 
the patentee worse off, and the Supreme Court calls this situation 
“fraud on a patent.”254 Taking is not permissible unless the taker makes 
a substantial change to the invention, which means the Pareto frontier 
is shifted outward or tilted. In cases where an alleged infringer makes 
a substantial change, courts could find such acts non-infringing, and 
make a new allocation of property rights to redistribute the resource 
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(the inventive concept of the claimed invention), even if the alleged 
infringer did use the inventive concept in question. 
Behind this reasoning is the idea that patent law encourages 
technological innovation, which is expressed in economic terms as 
tilting or shifting the Pareto frontier outward, and denotes creation in 
technology, knowledge, or other types of innovations that “make 
possible improvements in well-being which previously were not 
feasible.”255 Examples of welfare improvements listed by Calabresi 
include “a better wheat, cheaper solar energy, superconductors, 
manna.”256 Patent law, nonetheless, does not require a pioneering 
innovation for a patent to be granted, not to mention that the threshold 
of sufficient innovation to avoid an infringement is lower than that of 
obtaining a patent.257 Yet just moving along the frontier without 
making a substantial innovation is considered to be merely taking the 
same inventive concept, no matter what tests the court resorts to. 
B. Preexisting Pareto Optimality as the Defense to 
Infringement 
The defenses to the application of the doctrine of equivalents are 
often based on separate rationales from factual equivalency itself. 
Courts and commentators often suggest that the defenses are founded 
on the public-notice function of the patent. This section suggests that 
several of the defenses are related to Pareto optimality, or the allocation 
of property rights, consented to by the patent owner and the PTO. 
1. Prior Art Bar 
Interpreted from the contractarian view, a patent grant could be 
considered an agreement between the patent owner and the state 
(representative of the public).258 This agreement is premised on two 
conditions: first, that the invention is fully disclosed in the 
specification,259 and second, that the claimed invention and prior art are 
sufficiently different.260 The second precondition indicates that prior 
																																								 																				
 255. Calabresi, supra note 12, at 1229.  
 256. Id. at 1229-30.  
 257. For the distinction between a pioneering patent and an improvement, see Jean M. 
Barkley, The Doctrine of Equivalents Analysis After Wilson Sporting Goods, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 
765, 774 (1993).  
 258. See Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim 
Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1989 (2005). 
 259. See id. at 1951 (“The enablement standard requires a person having ordinary skill in 
the art be able to make and use the embodiments claimed in the patent without undue 
experimentation.”). 
 260. 4 MOY, supra note 121, §13:80.  
148 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 34 
art serves as the background of the consent between the patent owner 
and the patent office regarding the patent grant; both agree that the 
patentee may not base her claim on prior art and that the patented 
invention must be sufficiently different from prior art.261 
From this viewpoint, it is clear that the prior bar to patent 
infringement is a defense based on a Pareto optimality existing at the 
time of the patent grant. Two conditions—that the patentee may not 
claim patent coverage that would ensnare the prior art, 262 and that the 
patented invention must sufficiently differ from the prior art—are 
inherently contained in the parties’ consent that reaches the initial 
Pareto optimality. The prior art bar excludes the patentee from claiming 
embodiments that are not novel, in addition to those obvious in light of 
the prior art, in view of the ordinary skill in the art.263 These are all part 
of the allocation of property rights (P) concluded by the transaction 
between the patent owner and the patent office, which consents on 
behalf of the public.264 
Using a hypothetical claim to further examine the range of 
equivalents265 is consistent with the premise that the prior art bar 
represents in part the original Pareto optimality (i.e., the original 
allocation of property rights between the patentee and the public), 
because a patentee may not obtain a patent with a scope that covers 
prior art.266 If a hypothetical claim violates the conditions of 
patentability (such as covering prior art), the patent holder’s claim of 
equivalency would be considered non-P.267 As the Federal Circuit 
stated in Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey and Associates: 
“a patentee should not be able to obtain, under the doctrine of 
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equivalents, coverage which he could not lawfully have obtained from 
the PTO by literal claims.”268 
The patent holder’s assertion of infringement is grounded in the 
original Pareto optimality and the corresponding allocation of property 
rights. If the scope of the patent, as asserted by the patentee through the 
doctrine of equivalents, violates the requirements of patentability, her 
assertion of the right would violate the original agreement between her 
and the patent office. It is obvious that one may not claim protection of 
her property right (P) through the doctrine of equivalents if in the end 
the assertion of equivalency would violate her property right (thus non-
P). Prior art limitations to the doctrine of equivalents mean that the 
patent holder’s assertion of her property right falls into the category of 
non-P.269 From another angle, raising the prior art bar as a defense 
seems to be the alleged infringer’s insistence that the patent scope 
should be limited to the original Pareto optimality. 
2. Prosecution History Estoppel and the Disclosure-
Dedication Doctrine 
Prosecution history estoppel and the disclosure–dedication 
doctrine are two limitations on the doctrine of equivalents similarly 
based on the acts of the patentee during the course of patent 
prosecution. Both refer to the Pareto optimality established by 
consensus between the patent holder and the PTO. The optimality is 
embodied in an allocation of rights between the patentee and the public; 
thus, this allocation is considered P. 
Prosecution history estoppel is based on the acts, including 
narrowing amendments, of the patentee during the prosecution of her 
patent; the subject matter relinquished for the purpose of securing a 
patent grant may not later be reclaimed through the assertion of the 
doctrine of equivalents.270 Explained by the contractarian view, as in 
the Coase theorem, when a patent applicant surrenders part of the 
patent scope to secure a patent grant, the agreement she transacted with 
the PTO does not encompass what was surrendered.271 Therefore, when 
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she asserts infringement (i.e., asserting the allocation of P), she may 
not base her claim on the patent scope that she surrendered and thus is 
not within the scope of rights allocated to her.272 As the Supreme Court 
stated in Festo, the aim of file history estoppel is to require the patentee 
to hold a consistent position: “the purpose of applying the estoppel in 
the first place—to hold the inventor to the representations made during 
the application process.”273 Only the contents of the original transaction 
between the patent holder and the PTO can be claimed later at the 
infringement stage. 
From the viewpoint of the agreement between the patent holder 
and the patent office, the exception rules to file history estoppel 
considerably resemble ascertaining the parties’ true intent behind the 
wording of the contract. For instance, the exception rule of 
unforeseeability can be explained by the idea that if an embodiment 
was unforeseeable at the time of the prosecution of the patent, the 
patentee may not be considered to have given up such a later-
development equivalent.274 The rule of tangentialness refers to a 
situation where the “language in the claim amendment […] was 
inadvertently too narrow” and thus fails to cover the equivalent in 
question.275 Tangentialness focuses on the rationale for the narrowing 
amendment,276 and it similarly indicates a situation where the patent 
holder’s true intent was not to relinquish the equivalent in question. As 
explained by Judge Rader, it “honor[s] the objective intent of the 
amendment.”277 
The disclosure–dedication bar (the public dedication doctrine) 
also refers to the contents of the agreement between the patent holder 
and the patent office. If subject matter is disclosed in the specification 
but unclaimed, the disclosure–dedication bar prevents the patent holder 
from recapturing that subject matter through the assertion of the 
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doctrine of equivalents.278 The fact that the subject matter is disclosed 
but not claimed indicates that it is not within the scope of the agreement 
that formed the allocation of property rights, and it thus falls within the 
scope of non-P. The disclosure–dedication doctrine thus has the same 
function as file history estoppel, to distinguish subject matter within or 
outside the property rights allocated to the patentee (P or non-P). From 
this perspective, similar to the consensus between the patentee and the 
PTO, the public dedication doctrine can also be considered a type of 
estoppel.279 
CONCLUSION 
Smith’s brief comment on the similarity between nuisance law 
and the doctrine of equivalents leaves room for discussing why the two 
sets of doctrines have affinities. Nuisance law can be a universally 
applicable prototype that concerns the conflict between the owner’s 
right of exclusion and another’s privilege of use, with the conflict 
resolution tied to the reasonableness of the use in question. This 
prototype can potentially be applied to various issues of intellectual 
property law. 
Inherent in nuisance law is a model for delineating property rights, 
which, according to Smith, is a hybrid regime mixing the exclusion and 
the governance strategies.280 This model fulfills the function of 
economizing information costs. The transition from the exclusion 
strategy to the governance strategy allows harmonization of the 
owner’s right of exclusion and another’s claim to use the same asset. 
The key to harmonization is the reasonableness of the use. Patent 
infringement, involving a transition from literal infringement to 
infringement by equivalents, can similarly be considered a hybrid 
regime, with the doctrine of equivalents serving the role of 
harmonizing use conflicts. 
Coase’s theoretical context further elucidates this topic. Inherent 
in both nuisance law and the doctrine of equivalents is that the 
government allocates property rights when doing so could enhance 
well-being.281 The reasonableness test in nuisance law contains a cost–
benefit analysis; in patent law, it requires shifting the Pareto frontier 
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outward to prompt the government to reallocate property rights. The 
difference indicates that patent law places special emphasis on 
innovation. 
